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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we model health care provider choice in Bolivia with 
a Random Parameter Logit (RPL) using MECOVI data during the 
period 1999 and 2000. To our knowledge this is the first time that a 
RPL is used for modeling health care provider choice in Bolivia. 
We found that price and income are determinants of the decision 
choice of health care provider. Increasing government prices or 
fees shift the demand from government to private health facilities 
for children and women. In addition, women are more sensitive 
than children and adults to changes in price and income. The 
perception of Quality is significant just for private health facilities 
except for children. Finally, people would rather private instead of 
government facilities and self care treatment when they are ill.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: C01 C15 I38 
Keywords: Random Parameter Logit, Government and Private Health Facilities, Quality, 
Prices or User Fees. 
 
* Jose A. Canaviri is MsC. in Economics at Oklahoma State University and Project Director at 
Excellence Time Consulting (ETC) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are some people that believe that there might be a broken marriage between 
health economics – in particular, health care issues – and econometric techniques 
[18]. Nevertheless, health care demand modeling has undergone a major evolution 
since the early 1960’s, when first economists became interested in estimating the 
demand for health services [30]. 
 
A specific study about health care has became interesting lately: Health Care Provider 
Choice. Choice behavior can be characterized by a decision process, which is 
informed by perceptions and beliefs based on available information, and influenced 
by affect, attitudes, motives and preferences; however, we can never measure all the 
aspects of the complex life course of consumer choices, so that we are never sure 
whether appears to be irrational behavior [4]. 
 
Modeling health care provider choice using different methodologies was being used 
including the use of Poisson [31], Tobit and Multinomial Logit [1] [5], Multinomial 
Probit [2] [5], Independent Multinomial Probit [5], Nested Multinomial Logit [9] [23], 
Conditional Logit or Heterogeneous Logit [16], Bayesian and Parametric [28], and 
Mixed Logit [6] models. In addition, some other papers combine the monetary and 
non monetary [13], [27], [29] aspects related to health care provider choice. However, 
just one [27] was related to Bolivia. 
 
Bolivia, with its large indigenous population is poorly served by a hospital based 
health care system that ignores traditional cultures, in a country where more than 60 
percent of the population is made up of indigenous people [8]. There are over 30 
different cultural identities in Bolivia. The main ones are Aymara, Quechua and 
Guaraní nations, with their own knowledge, traditions and customs. In addition, 
Bolivia’s social indicators demonstrate severe socioeconomic inequalities in the 
country where conditions of people living in rural areas, relative to those of the urban 
population have worsened in the last 15 years [26]. 
 
In this sense, it is important to develop more academic research related to health care 
demand in Bolivia in order to improve public policy. In particular we want to answer 
the following questions: Which are the determinants of health care provider choice in 
Bolivia during 1999 and 2000?, how much sensitive is people to changes in user fees 
or prices charged by health care facilities?, is important the perception of “quality” 
for government health care facilities?, which facility is preferred for people when they 
are ill? 
In this paper we employ a Random Parameter Logit during 1999 and 2000 using a 
survey carried by the Bolivian Statistic National Institute (INE); specifically we use 
MECOVI (Continuous Household Survey).  
 
The paper is composed as follows: second section discusses the model, third section 
describes the institutional framework and data description, fourth section describes 
the empirical results and the last section is conclusions. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
A version of demand for medical care model was first proposed by Gertler et al [13] 
in Peru. A similar model was used in Kenya by Mwabu et al [30]. Then other two 
models used a system of demand equations and a simultaneous-equation system was 
used by Akin et al [1] [2] respectively. Dor, Gertler and Van der Gaag [9] used a 
reduced form model of the utility from quality. However, none of them used a 
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) but Borah [6] in a study of choice provider in rural 
India. 
 
In order to use a RPL model, we must set up the economic model framework. The 
model uses a direct and indirect utility functions for those individuals who were sick 
and had to choose between medical providers. In essence, individuals are faced with a 
discrete choice decision – each of which has a different potential impact (efficacy) on 
their health [13] –, so that a decision must be made among the various provider 
alternatives, including self care.  
 
The benefit from consuming medical care is an improvement in health and the cost 
of medical care is a reduction in the consumption of other goods. Furthermore, the 
patient is assumed to choose the health care alternative that yields the maximum 
expected utility1. Let the utility function be: 
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{ }Nnnj ,...,2,1, =∈There are i individuals facing j alternatives, where , is the 
direct conditional utility that individual i expects from provider j,  is the 
individuals’ level of consumption other than medical expenses and  is the 
expected level of improvement in health after receiving a treatment given an election 
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1 However, sometimes health professionals limit the actual choices patients can make by the treatments they 
offer to patients in hospitals, outpatient treatments, nursing homes, hospice and other clinical settings [20]. 
of medical provider. We can assume that the utility function is stable in time and does 
not change with new information. The usual assumptions about the utility function 
apply here: and 0,0 <> HHH UU0,0 <> CCC UU  
 
Medical care demand depends on both observed and unobserved characteristics of 
the individual seeking medical care and the provider. The individual’s observed 
characteristics – that may influence the final choosing – might be sex, age, education, 
income, etc.; the unobserved could be the perception of the quality and service of the 
provider, preference for certain medical procedures or just a preference for being 
treated in certain way. The provider’s observed attributes may be the user fees 
charged, quality of the service2 – measured as availability of drugs and post natal 
medical services –, the distance from the ill person to the provider’s center and 
waiting times for getting medical attention; while unobserved would include the 
reputation of the provider, the level of cleanliness of the medical center, the 
provider’s medical experience, etc. In this sense we can define: 
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In equation (2) the individual’s consumption is a function of the monthly income   
and the expenses incurred in order to obtain medical attention  – such as medical 
services for all the visits, drugs and other expenses –.  The relation of price and 
income is important because if the price effect were independent of income, this will 
lead us to a restrictive assumption [9].  
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In equation (3) we can model in a log-linear form, the consumer’s valuation of some 
provider’s unobserved attributes jθ , and observed attributes  of provider j –  
which enters the model as interactions with observed individual characteristics – ; 
where is the medical care that an individual i receives from a provider j and it is 
assumed to be positive. In addition, the coefficient vector 
ijX
ijh
ϖ  has components that 
are either random or fixed. A random coefficient3 represents random taste of 
                                                 
2 There are many ways of measure quality such as: physical facilities, number of staff members and level of 
supervision, availability of essential drugs and equipment, provision of basic health services, infrastructure 
(electricity and running water) and basic adult and child health services including: availability of a laboratory 
and the ability to vaccinate children and to provide prenatal, postnatal services, and number of functioning X-
ray machines [24]. However, due to data limitations we just use availability of essential drugs and postnatal 
services as a proxy of quality. In this way we are assuring the eternal critics about lacking to measure and post 
incorporation of quality in this kind of studies [2] [9] [16]. 
3 This can be represented as random tastes heterogeneity and can be decomposed into observed and 
unobserved (random) components [6]. 
individual i for an observed attribute, say xij of the provider j or interaction of some 
individual characteristics (e.g. age, sex, etc.) with the provider attribute xij. Since we 
are modeling (3) in a log-linear way, this guarantees non-negative values for the 
random coefficients, whereas the other three (normal, triangular and uniform) almost 
certainly guarantee some negative values [14]. Finally, the individual’s unobserved 
attributes are incorporated in ijε . In this way, all the observed and unobserved 
attributes are specified. An interesting feature is that the income is interacting with 
prices in equation (2) in order to determine whether low income individuals are price 
sensitive [2] [13].  
 
Together, equations (1), (2) and (3) determine a general structural specification of a 
behavioral model of health care demand. In order to implement this model we must 
choose a functional form. Gertler and Van der Gaag [11] and Gertler et al [13] had 
demonstrated that the utility function described in equation (1) is linear in health 
status and quadratic in consumption: 
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and should allow for a non-constant marginal rate of substitution of health for 
consumption. If we replace from (3) into equation (4) and normalized ijH 0iα =1 
then we will have our indirect utility function: 
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where ),,( 21 iii ααϖβ =/ , ,),,( 2ijijijij CCXX =/ ),( ijijij ξεν = (stochastic component) 
and jθ  is defined as above. Thus, any individual knows her and chooses to attend 
a health care provider when she was ill. However, 
ijX/
jθ iβ/ and  remain unidentified and 
must be estimated. For purposes of estimation, remains latent and a function 
such  acquires the values of 1 if the individual makes a health care provider choice 
and 0 otherwise. Thus, the probability that an individual i choose alternative j is given 
by: 
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We want to allow for the possibility that the information relevant to making a choice 
that is unobserved may indeed be sufficiently rich in reality to induce correlation 
across alternatives in each choice situation and indeed across choice situations [14]. 
In this context, we split the stochastic component ijν  into two additive 
components ijij ξε , ijξ. Further, is a random term with zero mean whose distribution 
over individuals depends in general on observed attributes relating to provider j and 
individual i and ijε is a random term with zero mean that is iid over alternatives and 
does not depend on observed attributes. Denote the density of )( Ψijf ξijξ by where 
are the fixed parameters of the distribution. For a given value of Ψ ijξ , the 
conditional choice probability that individual i chooses alternative j is:  
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ijξSince is not given the (unconditional) choice probability is the following Logit 
integrated formula integrated over all values of ijξ ijξweighted by the density of : 
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This is called the Random Parameter Logit model. 
 
Random Parameter Logit 
 
A common concern about discrete choice models is the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) which is the ratio of probabilities of choosing any two alternatives 
that must be independent of the attribute or the availability of a third alternative [15]. 
With the RPL model through the relaxation of the IIA property enable the model to 
be specified in such a way that the choice sets can be correlated across each 
individual [14]. The same happens with the Multinomial Probit, which allows all 
possible correlations among error terms [2], [10], [21]. Nevertheless, the normal 
distribution with the latter model may not be appropriate in all situations [6]. In 
addition, the main impediment to widespread use of the Multinomial Probit is that 
the estimation of the choice probabilities is very cumbersome and time consuming 
[5]. 
 
On the other hand with Multinomial Logit the assumption is that the correlation 
between each pairing of the errors in the model is zero, restricting the correlation just 
for pairs [2], [17]. What is more, according to Bolduc [5], it may be inappropriate to 
formulate policy recommendations based on this model, which is by far the most 
widely used estimator in the literature. 
 
The RPL model provides greater flexibility compared to other discrete choice models 
in that the random components of the utility specification may be assumed to have 
any distribution, so that this allows flexible modeling of unobserved heterogeneity 
that results from unobserved factors such as tastes and attitudes, waiting times, etc. 
[6]. Thus, the RPL model is considered to be the most available promising state of 
the art discrete choice model currently available [6]. 
 
III. Institutional Framework and Data Description 
 
MECOVI Survey 
The MECOVI (Continuous Household Survey) is a sample investigation carried out 
to particular household. It has done through a multi-thematic questionnaire, which 
allows the study of  life conditions of household and their different components.   
 
The MECOVI’s aim is the empowerment and institutionalization of household 
surveys that measure life conditions. The questionnaire is organized by sections and 
allows the investigation of general characteristics, educational, labor, health, expenses, 
income, and basic services of household.  
 
The analysis unities for this paper were: 1) household as a consumption unity, where 
took place income and expenses transactions; and 2) the household members looking 
for socio-demographic characteristics, labor, and income.  
 
The survey contains information about established household in capital cities, urban 
areas and rural areas of Bolivia. The capital cities and metropolitan area composed by 
Sucre, La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Trinidad and 
Cobija. 
 
The sample design for the survey contained the selection of a primary unities samples 
(UPM’s) that correspond to 130 household (Census Sector). In the other hand, in the 
disperse area the UPM’s are communities with different household sizes that 
correspond to 50 household approximately. Finally, the secondary unities samples 
(USM’s) are particular household within the selected UPM. 
 
 
 
 
Health Care System of Bolivia 
 
In Bolivia Health Care is delivered through the Ministry of Health, the Social Security 
Fund and the Private Sector. The Ministry of Health is responsible for the health care 
of the poor and covers only 25% of the population. The Social Security Fund serves 
industrial workers, civil servants and a small percentage of the service sector, which is 
20% of the population. The Private for-profit sector provides services to about 5% 
of the population, and the non-profit sector (NGO’s) 10% of urban dwellers and 
25% of the rural population. An estimated 30% of the population does not receive 
western medical care. Some of these people consult traditional healers known as 
yatiris, jampiris, curanderos, cullahuayas and naturistas [19].  In addition, Considering 
the Bolivia’s total population, the number of beds in Medical Establishments is not 
enough. This is due because of infrastructure and reduced personnel they have [7].  
 
Finally, the expenditures for health by government are not considerable. As a result, 
there are not enough Medical Establishments, the number of beds is insufficient, and 
the number of medical trained professionals is insufficient. In addition, the national 
expenditure in health per capita is too low. All these factors seem to lead to 
inefficiency and not enough service for most of Medical Establishments in Bolivia 
[7]. 
 
Data Description 
 
In order to model health care provider in Bolivia, we should focus just in patients 
that are considered ill or had some illness during the period of MECOVI survey. In 
addition, this paper only covers outpatient treatment because of the nature of data.  
 
For purposes of estimation, the data corresponds to 1999 and 2000. Both databases 
were merged and individuals from 1999 that were interviewed in 2000 were 
eliminated. Thus, the data contains 1999 individuals and new data added for 2000. 
Additionally, three RPL models were designed: one for children under 5 years old, for 
adults, and for women who had a child twelve months before the survey. 
 
In order to modeling equation (5) we used the following variables: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Variable Description
Latent Utility Variables
Govij a), b), c), d) = 1 if the source of treatment is a Government health center; = 0 otherwise. 
Privij a), b), c), d) = 1 if the source of treatment is a Private health center; = 0 otherwise. 
Selfij a), b), c), d) = 1 if the source of treatment is Self Care; = 0 otherwise. 
Provider’s Observed Attributes and Interactions with Individual’s Observed Characteristics
Qualityj a), b) , c) = 1 if essential drugs and post natal services were available at health center j; = 0 
otherwise 
Pj a), b), c), d) Price of alternative j 
Privj_Inci a), b), c)
 
Source of treatment Private interacted with Income. Govj_Inci and Selfj_Inci are defined 
similarly. 
Privj_Agei a), b), c)
 
Source of treatment Private interacted with Agei. Govj_Agei and Selfj_Agei are defined 
similarly. 
Pj_Genderi a), b) Price of alternative j interacted with Gender.  
Quaj_Inci a), b), c) Quality of health center j interacted with Income. 
Individual’s Observed Characteristics
Condi a), b), c) = 1 if individual was ill or had an illness during or before the survey; = 0 otherwise 
Educationi a), b), c), e) 
 
= 1 if education up to primary level completed and capable of reading & writing; = 0 
otherwise 
Genderi a), b), c) = 1 if male; = 0 otherwise 
Agei a), b), c) Expressed in years 
Areai a), b), c), d) = 1 if urban; = 0 otherwise 
Incomei a), b), c), e), f) Income per Household Head expressed in Bolivianos, measured monthly.  
Consi a), b), c), e), g) Household’s Consumption expressed in Bolivianos 
Cons2i a), b), c) Household’s Consumption squared expressed in Bolivianos 
EDAi a) = 1 if individual had diarrhea; = 0 otherwise. 
IRAi a) = 1 if individual had bronchopneumonia or pulmonary tuberculosis; = 0 otherwise. 
a) Used for children under 5 years old RPL model 
b) Used for adults RPL model 
c) Used for women RPL model who had a child twelve months before the survey  
d) Used for imputation of prices 
e) Used as a proxy from Household Heads as a proxy for their children. 
f) Includes main activity labor income, secondary activity labor income, extra hours labor income, bonus labor 
income, and non labor income. 
g) Includes education expenditures and consumption other than medical expenditures. 
 
Unlike other studies we incorporated essential drugs and post natal services as a 
proxy for Quality within provider’s observed attributes.  
 
In order to estimate the RPL model we need all the alternative prices Pj of alternative 
health care providers that were not chosen for individuals when they were ill [6], [13], 
[23]. The methods for imputing the missing prices include algorithms using separate 
pricing equations for each provider [6], hedonic price equations and corrections for 
possible bias [13] and random draws with replacement [23]. 
 
The expected amount spent by a person for a specific illness may depend not only on 
the standard fees, but also, for example, on the type of treatment, quality of 
treatment, individual idiosyncratic elements, and other non-medical expenses chosen 
by the patient [23]. 
 
For estimating the prices, first we gathered all individuals in groups according to the 
source of treatment chosen, type of illness and treatment, city, area (urban or rural) 
and finally UPM. In this way we assure homogeneity for estimating the alternative 
prices or user fees. Then, since the groups were similar, we started to estimate the 
prices according to Medical User Fees Reference Book [25] used for all doctors 
(public and private) as a reference in all health centers around Bolivia. In this book all 
the user fees are expressed as non monetary unities each of them equal to 10 
bolivianos. 
 
The interacted variables were added in order to capture the sensitiveness of gender 
with the prices, quality with income and health center facility with income and age 
respectively. The observed individual’s characteristics such as education, gender, age, 
income, etc. assure the incorporation of provider’s observed attributes, interactions 
with individual’s observed characteristics in equation (5). Together with the 
consumption level gives us the vector  
ijX ijX
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The dependent variables include various alternatives for an ill individual: 1) Public 
Hospital, 2) Health Center, 3) Health Post, 4) National Health System Centers, 5) 
Private Clinic/Hospital, 6) Private Medical Office, 7) Pharmacy and 8) Home. Thus, 
options 1) – 4) were classified as Govij, 5) – 7) as Privij and 8) as Selfij. 
 
It is worthy to mention that many studies about health care provider choice include 
distance as provider’s observed attribute [2], [6], [30]; others considered waiting times 
[9] and travel times [1], [13]; however, for this study we do not have this variable. 
What is more, due to the typography and complexity of Bolivia is very difficult to 
measure distance to a health center provider. 
 
Finally, for both consumption and income variables only positive values greater than 
zero were considered in order to avoid for unrealistic values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 CHILDREN (n=980) ADULT (n=1031) WOMEN (n=120) 
 MEAN SD MIN MAX MEAN SD MIN MAX MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Gov 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Priv 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Self 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0
             
P_Gov 12.3 42.8 0.0 600.0 71.8 386.6 0.0 7500.0 83.4 328.4 0.0 3000.0
P_Priv 7.0 44.8 0.0 800.0 41.9 325.7 0.0 7800.0 95.4 411.4 0.0 3100.0
P_Self 4.0 17.9 0.0 300.0 6.3 45.3 0.0 1300.0 0.3 4.1 0.0 60.0
             
Qual_Gov 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Qual_Priv 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Qual_Self 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0
             
Inc*Gov 421.1 1038.8 0.0 9570.0 214.0 999.6 0.0 32000.0 229.3 1743.7 0.0 32000.0
Inc*Priv 175.4 959.4 0.0 17823.3 131.7 854.8 0.0 20166.7 133.1 594.8 0.0 6416.7
Inc*Pself 405.4 1272.1 0.0 15000.0 104.1 528.3 0.0 12250.0 8.7 161.8 0.0 3045.0
             
Age*Gov 0.8 1.3 0.0 4.0 15.7 24.1 0.0 90.0 13.8 14.5 0.0 49.0
Age*Priv 0.2 0.8 0.0 4.0 4.7 14.5 0.0 87.0 13.6 15.0 0.0 47.0
Age*Self 0.9 1.4 0.0 4.0 12.5 21.3 0.0 90.0 0.4 3.8 0.0 41.0
             
P*Gender_Gov 6.4 30.7 0.0 500.0 38.9 319.8 0.0 7500.0 - - - - 
P*Gender_Priv 3.7 29.3 0.0 700.0 21.3 229.7 0.0 6000.0 - - - - 
P*Gender_Self 2.6 16.8 0.0 300.0 3.1 28.2 0.0 850.0     
             
Qual*Inc_Gov 327.7 916.1 0.0 8741.3 214.0 999.6 0.0 32000.0 229.3 1743.7 0.0 32000.0
Qual*Inc_Priv 156.2 948.3 0.0 17823.3 131.7 854.8 0.0 20166.7 130.6 593.7 0.0 6416.7
Qual*Inc_Self 300.0 1145.7 0.0 15000.0 104.1 528.3 0.0 12250.0 8.7 161.8 0.0 3045.0
             
Education 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
Gender 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 - - - - 
Age 2.0 1.4 0.0 4.0 38.5 21.5 6.0 98.0 27.8 7.2 14.0 49.0
Area 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Income 1132.5 1771.6 4.2 17823.3 948.6 1799.5 0.8 32000.0 1010.4 2919.7 5.0 32000.0
Cons 100.6 220.8 1.0 2826.7 86.0 145.7 1.0 1420.0 50.7 82.6 1.0 550.0
Cons2 36431.3 387977.3 0.0 7990044.4 16392.5 91424.0 0.0 2016400.0 4146.0 23906.2 0.0 302500.0
EDA 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 - - - - - - - - 
IRA 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 - - - - - - - - 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
RPL MODEL FINDINGS 
 
In order to estimate the model the Broyden algorithm and LIMDEP software were 
used. We estimated three models described in the previous section. The RPL models 
were estimated using Govij and Privij compared to Selfij. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients must be interpreted with relation to Selfij. The number of draws required 
to secure a stable set of parameter estimates varies enormously; the best test is to 
always estimate models over a range of draws. [14] In our models 500 draws were 
used. The results are described in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3. RANDOM PARAMETER LOGIT ESTIMATES 
 Notes:  ¥ _S denotes interaction with the health facility: Govij or Privij depending on the dependent variable. 
* Indicates significance at 10% 
** Indicates significance at 5% 
*** Indicates significance at 1% 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
Most of the literature on health care provider choice has been restricted to a situation 
in which the choice set is fixed across individuals [23]. In this paper, specifically in 
MECOVI survey the true generating process may vary across individuals by 
geographical location (cities, urban – rural, UPM’s and USM’s), nature of illness 
(EDA, IRA) and affordability. Moreover, identification of a discrete choice model 
requires variation across alternatives. Although variation across individuals (such as 
demographic variables) is not necessary it is desirable to include them in order to 
obtain precise estimates [13], [23].  
 
 Children Adults Women
 Gov Priv Gov Priv Gov Priv
CONS 0.00541 *** 0.01122 *** 0.00922 *** 0.00990 *** 0.01738 *** 0.01944 ***
 0.00005  0.00013  0.00007  0.00009  0.00055  0.00116  
CONS2 0.00000 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00002 *** -0.00003 ***
 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
GENDER 0.05425 *** 0.04195 *** 0.05065 *** 0.09912 *** -  -  
 0.01159  0.01578  0.01272  0.01476  -  -  
AGE -0.02505 *** -0.00351  -0.00389 *** -0.00305 *** -0.00647 *** -0.00311  
 0.00427  0.00538  0.00043  0.00048  0.00362  0.00677  
EDUCATION 0.22623 *** -0.01268  0.05828 *** -0.01067  0.03941  0.47935 ** 
 0.04330  0.06027  0.01666  0.02002  0.09912  0.18656  
QUALITY -0.02295  -0.11578 *** -0.09800 *** 0.10006 *** 0.10734  2.46818 * 
 0.02456  0.03196  0.03731  0.03334  0.22564  1.37990  
EDA 0.04762 *** 0.06378 *** -  -  -  -  
 0.01740  0.02214  -  -  -  -  
IRA 0.17585 *** -0.02380  -  -  -  -  
 0.01890  0.02487  -  -  -  -  
AREA 0.01570  0.11671 *** 0.14574 *** 0.02615  0.25236 ** 0.70579 ***
 0.03760  0.04396  0.04070  0.04111  0.11051  0.14365  
INC*_S¥ 0.00000  0.00003 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00004 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00292  
 0.00000  0.00001  0.00000  0.00000  0.00003  0.00178  
AGE*_S¥ 0.03034 *** 0.01898 ** 0.00035  0.00001  -0.00689 *** -0.00230  
 0.00589  0.00907  0.00035  0.00042  0.00215  0.00358  
P*GENDER_S¥ -0.00033 * -0.00017  -0.00007 *** -0.00005 *** -  -  
 0.00017  0.00015  0.00002  0.00001  -  -  
QUA*INC_S¥ 0.00003 *** -0.00001 ** fixed  -0.00003 *** fixed  -0.00287  
 0.00000  0.00000  -  0.00000  -  0.00178  
N 576.00  404.00  592.00  439.00  65.00  55.00  
Log likelihood  -67988.03  -44649.00  -69352.00  -57135.00  -5393.00  -2590.00  
R-sqrd   0.19  0.28  0.32  0.33  0.38  0.35  
RsqAdj 0.17  0.25  0.30  0.31  0.30  0.02  
The first interesting result is that Consumption is significant for all groups (children, 
adults and women) suggesting that price and income are determinants of the decision 
choice of health care provider according to equation (2). This result is in concordance 
with previous studies [13], [6], [9], [23]. However, income and price do not enter the 
model directly, so that elasticities between both variables might be estimated [13]. 
Consumption squared is also significant and has the expected sign suggesting that the 
utility function is concave in consumption, situation described in section II. 
 
Older individuals in all groups have a preference for self care treatment instead of 
government and private health centers and doctors since age is negative and 
significant for Gov regressions. A similar situation happens just for adults in Priv 
regression. 
 
More educated parents and individuals would rather government facilities when they 
are ill instead of treating by themselves.4 This is true for the benefits for children 
under 5 years old prevailing in government health facilities since almost all the 
medicines, drugs, and user fees are free due to SUMI (Universal Secure Maternal 
Infantile) system. This advantage is also reflected in specific ill-types for children such 
as diarrhea (EDA) or bronchopneumonia or pulmonary tuberculosis (IDA), where 
government are preferred instead of private facilities and/or self care treatment. 
Thus, health information is valuable to the consumer because it allows her to make 
better decisions about medical care [22].  However, for women that had a child 
before the survey, have completed up to primary level and live in an urban area;5 
prefer a private facility health center instead of self care. This is linked with the fact 
that medical auxiliaries are concentrated more in rural areas instead of doctors and 
nurses. Furthermore, the health sector does not have enough medical trained 
professionals in rural areas, decreasing the quality of medical attention [7].  
 
The perception of Quality – measured as the availability of essential drugs for 
medication and post natal services – is significant just for private health facilities 
except for children group. People would rather private instead of government 
facilities and self care treatment when they are ill. This fact might be true because 
there has not been an increase in the number of General Hospitals from 1999 to 
2003. This might be “a priori” indicator that expenditure in Investment has not  
done; consequently, the services (including drugs) cannot be enhancing in order to 
cover more population seeking for medical attention. [7] 
                                                 
4 Information increases the probability that a consumer uses medical care. What is more, poorly informed 
consumers tend to underestimate the productivity of medical care in treating illness [22]. 
5 Different arguments have been suggested for a positive relationship between health care expenditure and 
urbanization [12]. 
 
If income INC*S_ were the only determinant when choosing a health care provider, 
parents and individuals will chose a private health center instead a government or self 
care treatment. This is related with provider’s quality perceived by individuals 
interacted with income QUA*INC_S. Nevertheless, the negative sign of the latter 
variable might suggest that the user fees charged are high. 
 
Eventually, an individual’s decision to seek or purchase medical care is more likely to 
be based on individual characteristics such as the number of unhealthy days rather 
than prices, costs of medication, etc. [3] 
 
POLICY AND SIMULATIONS ON RPL MODELS 
 
Since is difficult to compare magnitudes of coefficients directly in RPL estimation 
results, a simulation based on some scenarios were done [2]. 
 
a) Increasing Government prices or fees in 10%. 
b) Increasing household income by 20%. 
c) Increasing household consumption (other than medical expenses) by 10% 
 
The procedure was to take the actual values of the independent variables for each 
individual and compute the probability of use for Govij and Privij holding constant 
Selfij. These probabilities were then averaged over the sample to obtain the results in 
Table 4. Then we changed the variables described in points a), b) and c) holding the 
rest constant. We repeated the exercise with the two health care provider choices. 
 
TABLE 4. POLICY SIMULATIONS FOR RPL MODELS 
   Gov Priv  Gov Priv  Gov Priv
0.4030 0.3786 0.4030 0.3786 0.4030 0.3786 Actual Prob. 
0.3921 0.3985 0.3912 0.3988 0.3922 0.3985 New Prob. 
CHILDREN 
Absolute Δ  -0.0109 0.0199 -0.0118 0.0202 -0.0108 0.0199 
Relative Δ% -2.70% 5.26% -2.93% 5.34% -2.68% 5.26% 
        
0.3578 0.3418 0.3578 0.3418 0.3578 0.3418 Actual Prob. 
0.3713 0.3847 0.3800 0.2930 0.3985 0.3414 New Prob. a)
Absolute Δ  0.0135 0.0429 b) 0.0222 -0.0488 c) ADULT 0.0407 -0.0004 
Relative Δ% 3.77% 12.55% 6.20% -14.28% 11.38% -0.12% 
        
0.3348 0.2245 0.3348 0.2245 0.3348 0.2245 Actual Prob. 
0.2923 0.3221 0.2903 0.3173 0.2994 0.3224 New Prob. 
WOMEN 
Absolute Δ  -0.0425 0.0976 -0.0445 0.0928 -0.0354 0.0979 
Relative Δ% -12.69% 43.47% -13.29% 41.34% -10.57% 43.61% 
 
Given an increase in prices or user fees in government health facilities (policy a)) the 
predicted probabilities of use are reduced for both children and women, except for 
adults that is the opposite. The reduction is more perceptible in women (12.69%). 
Thus, the probability of use Private facilities is increases for all groups. The strongest 
one is for women (43.47%). It is interesting that for children the probability of use is 
reduced since actually all prices or user fees are free. Hence, women and children 
seem to be sensitive – more in the women’s case – than adults group to a change in 
Government health facilities user fees. 
 
The second scenario b) increases the probability of use for government health 
facilities just for adults (6.20%).  Children and women prefer to use a private facility 
given an increase in household incomes by 20%. These findings for women are 
similar to those in previous section. Women have a preference to pay more, 
increasing their probability (41.34%) of use, for a better medical attention – especially 
post natal services – for their children. Therefore, an increase in household income 
will have a negative effect for government facilities suggesting two issues: there must 
be a decrease in the prices or user fees charged and/or an improvement in the 
provider’s quality perceived by individuals.  
 
Finally, for scenario c) children and women would rather use private facilities given 
an increase in household consumption. With this policy there is a trade off between 
choosing a government or private facility having less monetary income (due the 
consumption increase).  Thus children and women are able to sacrifice more income  
for a better medical attention supplied by private facilities.  
 
ELASTICITIES 
 
In order to observe the impact of prices and income in our RPL model, arc price and 
arc income elasticities were estimated. The arc elasticity is defined as 
Φ
ΦΔΔ=
P
PE where  reflects the probability of use for a certain facility health, P
P is the average of the probabilities, and Φ reflects any variable such as price or 
income. The elasticities measure the sensitivity of demand (probability of use) for 
each type of facility to a change in price or income. Thus, we estimated the 
probabilities of use for Govij and Privij holding constant Selfij following the same 
procedure described above. The variables that we changed were the price or user fee 
for government facilities and income. Hence, the elasticities were estimated with 
respect to those changes. Results are described in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5. ARC ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND 
 With respect to… Gov Priv
CHILDREN Gov Price fee -0.2882 -0.0677 
 Income -0.1634 0.2858 
    
ADULT Gov Price fee 0.4386 0.6191 
 Income 0.3310 -0.8456 
    
WOMEN Gov Price fee -1.4445 0.6223 
 Income -0.7830 1.8841 
 
A 10% increase in the government fees will reduce in 2.88% and 0.67% the demand 
for government and private health facilities for children respectively. In contrast, for 
adults a 10% increase in government fees will increase the demand in 4.39% and 
6.19% respectively. Women have a quite elastic demand, since the increase in fees will 
reduce demand for government facilities in 14.45% and will increase for private in 
6.22%. Again we observe that increasing the government fees will shift the demand 
from government to private health facilities for children and women. Adults seem to 
be price inelastic to the increase; however, the increase for using private (6.19%) is 
higher than for government facilities (4.39%).  
 
For income changes, women result to be price elastic also. Given a 10% increase in 
income women will increase the use of private facilities by 18.84%. Thus, health is 
considered a normal good since a rise in income increases the probability that 
children and women purchase “higher price/higher quality” alternatives [13]. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we model health care provider choice in Bolivia with a Random 
Parameter Logit (RPL) using MECOVI data during the period 1999 and 2000. To 
our knowledge this is the first time that a RPL model is used for modeling health care 
provider choice for Bolivia. 
 
We found initially that price and income are determinants of the decision choice of 
health care provider;6 however price and income do not enter in the model directly. 
By estimating elasticities we discovered that increasing government prices or fees 
shift the demand from government to private health facilities for children and 
women; the preference for private facilities is stronger for women in relation to the 
other groups. In addition, women are more sensitive than children and adults to 
changes in price and income. On the other hand, an increase in household incomes 
will have a negative effect for government facilities suggesting two issues: there must 
                                                 
6 Similar findings were found in previous studies [23], [27] and [29]. 
be a decrease in the prices or user fees charged and/or an improvement in the 
provider’s quality perceived by individuals.  
 
The perception of Quality – measured as the availability of essential drugs for 
medication and post natal services – is significant just for private health facilities 
except for children group. People would rather private instead of government 
facilities and self care treatment when they are ill. 
 
Education plays an important role. More educated parents and individuals would 
rather government facilities when they are ill instead of treating by themselves. This 
must be complemented with information about the benefits government facilities 
offer. However, most of the analysis we have done in this paper suggest that 
Government facilities lack of quality. In this sense, policy issues for demand analysis, 
in a low income country such as Bolivia, are access to facilities, capturing true 
demand patterns, and demand creation or how to assure that new government 
services are used [1].   
 
To sum up, according to Canaviri [7] the expenditures for health by government are 
not considerable. As a result, there are not enough Medical Establishments, the 
number of beds is insufficient, and the number of medical trained professionals is 
insufficient. In addition, the national expenditure in health per capita is too low. All 
these factors seem to lead to inefficiency and not enough services for most of 
Medical Establishments in Bolivia. Factors that shift the potential demand that 
government “may” have to private health facilities or simply self care treatment. 
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